We consider a continuous time system influenced by different agents who adopt moving horizon control. The well known Nash equilibrium concept is used to define two solution concepts fitting in the moving horizon structure. One of them is analyzed in more detail in the class of linear quadratic games. The (dis)advantages of moving horizon control are illustrated by means of a government debt stabilization model.
Introduction
Many developments in game and control theory in the last few decades have caused an increasing interest in using nonzero-sum dynamic games for modelling several economic problems. In particular in the area of environmental economics ( [Ze91] or [Fe98] ) or in the area of macro-economic policy coordination ([Aa95] , [Ta86] or [Ne95] ), dynamic game theory is a very natural framework to model problems. One of the basic questions that arises in these models deals with the information of the players, which can in real life be quite uncertain. Therefore, several solution concepts exist and the corresponding strategies are often compared with each other. Two I would like to thank J.C. Engwerda for giving me the idea of introducing moving horizon control in the area of dynamic game theory. I would also like to thank him and J.M. Schumacher for many valuable comments.
well known solution concepts are the open loop (OL) and the feedback (FB) Nash equilibrium. The OL information structure is a bit shortcoming in its economic relevance. However, especially in the class of linear quadratic games, it is often possible to arrive at analytic results in this information structure. The FB information structure is more realistic, but one should expect fewer analytic results. Another basic question arising in dynamic games concerns the planning horizon on which the players base their decisions. Is it finite or infinite? And, if it is finite, what is its length? These questions are not always easy to answer. In this paper we introduce new solution concepts in which finite and infinite horizon optimization are combined. As the name already reveals, in the so called moving horizon (MH) solution concepts the players continuously extend their horizon as time evolves, which allows them to incorporate new information of the system at any point of time. Obviously, feedback information is required in this approach, which make the MH solution concepts of practical importance. However, we will also make use of open loop notions leading to analytic results. The origin of moving horizon control lies in the field of control theory, where it is also known under the names receding horizon control or model predictive control, often abbreviated as MPC. In the last twenty years MPC has become quite popular in industry. For some recent developments we refer to [Bit97] or to [Ni98] . Besides these references and many other literature on MPC in control theory there also exists literature in operations research resembling the moving horizon approach. For example in [Se91] , one can find a theory about rolling horizon decision making which is mainly applied in production planning problems.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section we define two new solution concepts based on moving horizon control. The first concept is based on the open loop Nash equilibrium and the second is based on the feedback Nash equilibrium. The paper mainly concentrates on the former concept. In section 3 and in the following sections we consider the class of linear quadratic games. For the open loop moving horizon solution we make use of the Hamiltonian approach. Special attention is paid to the scalar case. In section 4 we illustrate the theory of this paper with a government debt stabilization model, first introduced in [Ta86] . The paper ends with some concluding remarks.
The Moving Horizon Solution Concept
In traditional formulations of nonzero-sum differential games one has the choice between either a finite or an infinite horizon. It is not always clear what the length of the planning horizon should be. Why should the players limit their scope to a finite horizon? It is not to be expected that life ends after this period. Also infinite horizon models seem a bit shortcoming with respect to this point of view. What does it practically mean to consider a period of infinite length?
In principle it is to be expected that the players will base their actions on a finite horiMoving Horizon Control in Dynamic Games zon. However it is not to be expected that the players will not take into account the future after this horizon as time evolves. It is more likely that the players will extend their horizon during the evolution of the game. This is exactly the point of view in moving horizon control. At any point of time the players base their actions on a finite horizon and after a small period of time the players extend their horizon and re-optimize their actions based on the new information which has become available.
An important ingredient in differential games is the state evolution, influenced by the players through control functions in a way described by a a differential equation: _ xt = ft; xt; u 1 t; ; u N t; x0 = x 0 ;
(1) where the state and the actions (or controls) of the players at time t are denoted by xt 2 IR n and u i t 2 IR m i , for i = 1 ; ; N , respectively. Furthermore, the initial state is denoted by x 0 and _ x is the time derivative of x. The costs of the players are defined on an infinite horizon. However, as pointed out before, the actions in moving horizon control will always be based on a finite horizon, say of length L. This leads us to introduce cost functionals, to be denoted by L t i , defined on time periods of the form t; t + L for all t 0:
The interpretation of these costs is as follows. At time t functions u i , defined on the interval t; t+L , are chosen by the players. Then from (1) a state x, also defined on the interval t; t+L , results. This state together with the controls of the players then lead to certain costs L t i . We will refer to this finite horizon game on the interval t; t + L as the local game at time t. Up to now, we have not spoken about the information structure of the game. In this paper we consider open loop and feedback information patterns, which both lead to different solution concepts. We are now able to define the two moving horizon solution concepts. In the rest of this paper we will also refer to the game described by (3) and (4) as the local game at time t or simply as the local game.
Remarks:
In finite horizon problems the cost functionals are often provided with a terminal penalty, which is obviously not taken into account by the moving horizon solution concepts. Although it would not make the analysis more difficult if we would do so, it does not seem very realistic to do this in the moving horizon solution concepts, since the players will never reach the endpoint of the local game.
Locally the players always play a finite horizon game (at least they play the initial step). However, the moving horizon solution concepts obviously lead to infinite horizon solutions, which may cause stability problems. So, besides existence and uniqueness questions, that naturally arise from the definition, another important issue is the stability, i.e. do moving horizon solutions stabilize the system? The length of the planning horizon in the local game (L) plays an important role in this. It is to be expected (see also [Bit97] ) that especially for small values of L stability problems may arise.
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An important notion which is often dealt with in the literature is time consistency, see e.g. [Ba89] . This notion deals with the incentive of the players to deviate from their strategies if there has been some unexpected change in the dynamics. Both moving horizon solution concepts are time consistent, since, by definition, at any point of time the actual state is used in the local game.
It is important to realize that the moving horizon concepts are not defined as equilibria. It is simply a method to control the system which may resemble reality better than the control strategies based directly on the existing equilibrium concepts.
Moving Horizon Control in LQ Games
We will now concentrate on the class of 2-player linear quadratic (LQ) games, which are specified by a linear differential equation and quadratic cost functionals, i.e. 
The OLMH Solution -General Formulation
In this section we focus on the open loop moving horizon solution in LQ games. Our starting point is the result of lemma 2.3. It is well known (see e.g. [Ba95] , chapter 6) that in the open loop Nash equilibria of LQ games the cross terms T 2 R 12 2 and T 1 R 21 1 (recall that we denoted state and controls by Greek symbols in the local game) play no role. Thus without loss of generality we assume in the rest of this section and in the next section that R 12 = R 21 = 0 .
In order to investigate the OLMH solution we need to consider the open loop Nash equilibrium of the local game. The Hamiltonian approach (see e.g. [Ba95] , chapter 6, or [Eng98] ) leads to an equivalent formulation of such an equilibrium in terms of a boundary value problem: 
If the boundary value problem has a solution on the interval 0; L , then the open loop Nash equilibrium is given by i = ,B T i i . So, according to lemma 2.3, the optimal controls in the OLMH solution can then be written as u OLMH i t = ,B T i i 0.
Using this result we arrive at the following lemma. 
where M is defined by (6). Proof: The first part of the lemma, i.e. the existence condition, follows from theorem 1 in [Eng98] . For the second part, note that (5) implies that This completes the proof.
Obviously, the parameter L plays an important role in the OLMH solution. In the rest of this paper differentiation with respect to L is denoted by a prime (in order to indicate the difference with differentiation with respect to t).
From (8) 
where the closed loop matrix A cl L is given by
This expression involves the matrix functions G 1 , G 2 and H. They can either be derived by a direct computation of e ML or by solving the initial value problem H 0 L = ,AHL + S 1 G 1 L + S 2 G 2 L; H0 = I;
Note that (11) and (12) Observe that the left hand side equals H 00 (see (11)). Finally the initial conditions for H and H 0 directly follow from the initial conditions in (11) and (12).
An obvious disadvantage of theorem 3.2 is the symmetry condition. On the other side, if this condition is satisfied then HL is uniquely specified by (13), which enables us to compute H without also having to compute G 1 and G 2 . Moreover, in the next theorem we will show that the symmetry condition leads to a differential equation for A cl completely in terms of the original data.
Proof: Differentiating (10) and using (11) A problem in computing H, G 1 and G 2 is clearly the number of unknowns. In the case n = 2 , the number of unknowns in (11) and (12) already equals 12. Moreover in the N-player case the number of matrix differential equations obviously equals N+1.
In the next theorem we reduce this number (3 in the 2-player case) in a special case to 2.
Theorem 3.4 If Q i = q i Q, for some q i 2 IR and some matrix Q, then G i L = q i GL, where G is uniquely specified by G 0 L = QHL + A T GL; G0 = 0:
Obviously,G satisfies the equations by which G i is uniquely specified, i.e. (12). But then it must hold that G i =G i .
We now describe a method to determine the optimal state and controls in the OLMH solution using the results of the theorems 3.3 and 3.4. Suppose that the conditions in these theorems are satisfied. Then A cl can be determined from (14) and (15). Due to the result of theorem 3.4, (10) can be rewritten as GH ,1 = q 1 S 1 + q 2 S 2 ,1 A , A cl , provided that q 1 S 1 + q 2 S 2 is regular. This then leads to the following expression for the optimal controls in the OLMH solution:
where the optimal state trajectory x OLMH is given by x OLMH t; L = e A cl Lt x 0 :
In the next section (about the scalar case) and in section 4 (an economic example about government debt stabilization) we will partly follow this method to arrive at explicit formulas for x OLMH and u OLMH i
. We end this section by considering the limit L ! 1 . This is the same as considering the limit of the open loop Nash equilibrium of the finite horizon game as the horizon length tends to infinity. In [Eng98] it is shown that if this limit exists and if the resulting equilibrium stabilizes the closed loop system, then the equilibrium that is obtained in the limit is also an open loop Nash equilibrium of the infinite horizon game. For the OLMH solution this result can be formulated as follows. 
The OLMH Solution -Scalar Case
The model simplifies considerably if the system parameters are all scalars. In this case it can be shown that the OLMH solution exists and is unique for all L 0 and it is possible to derive explicit formulas for the optimal state and controls in the OLMH solution. This is done in appendix A, section A.1. 
Proof:
The first and second part of the theorem are easily seen by computing _ x OLMH . For the third part, note that for t 0 the equations x OLMH t; L 1 = x OLMH t; L 2 and wL 1 = wL 2 are equivalent. The latter has no solution since w is strictly increasing.
In figure 1 the graphs of two optimal state trajectories in the OLMH solution are drawn in the case x 0 0. Note that for increasing L, the rate of convergence wL is also increasing. For L ! 1 this rate approaches ,, which is the rate of conver- 
and u OLMH i t; L = 0 if s 1 q 1 + s 2 q 2 = 0 . In the latter case the closed loop system obviously remains uncontrolled (this is of course not a big surprise!). The behavior of the optimal controls in the former case is characterized by the following theorem and illustrated in figure 2. 
Finally, there is one and only one t 0 satisfying u OLMH i t; L 1 = u OLMH i t; L 2 . Since w is strictly increasing, this equation has exactly one solution t 0.
In figure 2 two graphs of the optimal control in the OLMH solution of player i in the case b i x 0 0 are drawn. Let t be the t-coordinate corresponding to the intersection point of the two graphs. By increasing L from L 1 to L 2 the initial control increases. In fact it is readily seen from the figure that this property holds for all t between 0 and t . For t t the situation is the other way around, i.e. by increasing L from L 1 to L 2 the control value decreases. We conclude that in this sense the OLMH solution is
better than the open loop Nash equilibrium of the infinite horizon game in the short run and worse in the long run. 
respectively. The parameters ; 1 and 2 are weights, whereas f, m and d are given target values. Furthermore is a discounting factor. All the parameters introduced so far, i.e. r, d 0 , the weights, the targets and the discounting factor are assumed to be positive. Moreover we also assume that
rd + f , m 0;
, r 0;
:= 1 + 2 , r , r 0:
Assumptions (28), (29) 
Note that x 2 does indeed not depend on L. We have introduced two state variables, while the dynamics is in fact scalar. This is due to the presence of the target constants.
In the following we denote the state as the column xt; L = x 1 t; L x 2 t 
and , , and are given by (31), (59) and (71) 
Theorem 4.2 The function
Finally, the graphs of t 7 ! d OLMH t; L 1 and t 7 ! d OLMH t; L 2 do not intersect. On the other hand, observe that the left-hand side of this equation is negative, which is obviously a contradiction.
In figure 3 
The results of the following theorem are illustrated in figure 4 .
Finally, there is one and only one t 0 satisfying f OLMH t; L 1 = f OLMH t; L 2 .
Proof: Since d 1 L = d 0 we can derive an explicit expression for vL from (38).
Plugging this expression into (43) and (44), and using the identity 
The limits in (46) and (47) 
Now, L L implies that , x 20 p vL= 0 (see also the proof of theorem 4.3) and this factor is therefore unequal to 0. Consequently, is given by
It can easily be seen that is bounded and decreasing. The upperbound is reached for L L and can easily be determined numerically in concrete situations, whereas the lowerbound (reached for L ! 1 ) is given by , =2 ,1 log1 + , =2=r.
With the results of theorem 4.3 and the discussion about we can visualize the behavior of the fiscal control in the OLMH solution, see figure 4. As mentioned before, the gap between the asymptotic fiscal control ands the target exceeds 1 x 20 = for all L L and for increasing L this gap decreases. In this sense, the open loop Nash equilibrium of the infinite horizon game is better than the OLMH solution. However, the gap between the initial fiscal control and the target is increasing for increasing L. In fact by increasing L from L 1 to L 2 the gap between the optimal fiscal control and the target increases for all t between 0 and t , where t is the t-coordinate corresponding to the intersection point of the curves f = ft; L 1 and f = ft; L 2 . In
We proceed by analyzing the monetary policy in the OLMH solution. Since the optimal controls only differ by a multiplicative constant (see (77) 
The following theorem then directly follows from theorem 4.3. 
Finally, there is one and only one t 0 satisfying m OLMH t; L 1 = m OLMH t; L 2 .
The limit of m 1 for L ! 1 can also be written as m + 2 x 20 = . This implies that the gap between the asymptotic monetary control and the target is at least 2 x 20 = .
Finally, note that the equation f OLMH t; L = f is equivalent to m OLMH t; L = m so that the point L; m is the intersection point between the curves corresponding to m = mt; L and m = m in the t; m,plane.
We visualize the behavior of the monetary control in the OLMH solution in figure 5 . In a similar manner as for the fiscal player it can be argued that also for the monetary player the OLMH solution is more interesting than the open loop Nash equilibrium of the infinite horizon game in the short run and that the latter is more interesting in the long run. 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper the concept of moving horizon control has been introduced in the area of nonzero-sum differential games. Specifically, we defined two solution concepts (based on either open loop or feedback Nash equilibria) combining both finite and infinite horizon optimization. At any point of time the players determine an optimal control based on a finite horizon of length L (the local game) and only play the initial control. This is repeated continuously in time and in this way a control defined on an infinite horizon results. For the computation of the optimal controls in the OLMH solution we follow the method described below theorem 3.4. Note that the conditions of this theorem are satisfied. It follows immediately that the optimal controls are given by (17) if s 1 q 1 + s 2 q 2 0. If s 1 q 1 + s 2 q 2 = 0 , then also s 1 q 1 = s 2 q 2 = 0 . Now, from (8) and theorem 3.4, we observe that the optimal controls contain the factor b i q i = p s i q i = 0 . Obviously the optimal controls are zero in the case s 1 q 1 + s 2 q 2 = 0 .
A.2 Government Debt Stabilization
Recall from section 4 that ; it follows that AS 1 = AS 2 is symmetric, so that the conditions in theorem 3.2 are satisfied. From this theorem it then follows that H satisfies the second order differential equation (13 
It is immediately clear that a 3 L = 0 , which reduces (65) and (68) The optimal state trajectory is the solution of the differential equations _ x 1 = a 1 x 1 + a 2 x 2 and _ x 2 = a 4 x 2 . Clearly, the case a 1 = a 4 needs to be considered separately. 
